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NOTES
THE OTHER WAR ON DRUGS: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION, THE FDA, AND PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS AFTER WYETH V. LEVINE
JOSEPH F. PETROS 111*
INTRODUCTION
Amidst the debates over health care reform in the United
States, there are several common desires that most Americans
share: lower costs, greater availability, and continued innovation.
Yet as Americans have fixed their attentions on reform legisla-
tion, few outside academia have noticed a recent and potent
blow to these desires in one of the major sectors of the health
care industry. This is, perhaps, because the blow came from the
"least dangerous"' branch of the federal government. The case
was Wyeth v. Levine,2 and the issue was the doctrine of federal
preemption as it applies to the regulation of prescription drug
warning labels by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled in its 2009 decision that
the FDA's judgments regarding prescription drug warning labels
do not preempt state tort juries from reaching different, and in
this case conflicting, judgments.' The result is that those who
suffer adverse effects from a prescription drug still have standing
to sue the drug manufacturer under state tort law for failure to
warn, even though the drug's warning label has met the rigorous
standards of, and has been specifically approved by, the FDA.'
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., University of Notre Dame,
2008. I would like to thank Hans von Spakovsky and the Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation for the inspiration they gave me to
write this Note. I would also like to thank Sheldon Bradshaw, Professor Richard
Garnett, and Professor Vincent Rougeau for their helpful comments and
advice. Soli Deo gloria.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (description of the federal judiciary).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
3. See id. at 1204.
4. Id.
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The question of whether federal regulation of prescription
drugs should replace conflicting state tort law is a sizable one, for
the positions taken by the Court and our nation's policy makers
directly impact consumers. While denying preemption provides
injured consumers a remedy against manufacturers under state
law, it also has significant negative consequences for consumers
across the country, touching on the cost, availability, and safety of
prescription drugs. If pharmaceutical companies have to bear
the burden of complying with both federal law and the common
law of all fifty states, even when it is difficult or impossible to do
so, the cost of that burden will be passed on to consumers. Also,
these companies will be less willing to invest in and produce new
products if there is a substantial risk that, even if they comply
with the FDA's detailed standards, they may still be sued under a
state's common law. Given the increased attention to the
problems in our nation's health care system and the widespread
desire to make the system more efficient, the consequences of
denying the preemptive effect of the already-extensive federal
regulation of prescription drugs cannot be ignored. The federal
government should be concerned with facilitating the most effi-
cient national market for prescription drugs by providing uni-
form standards, and yet without federal preemption it only
complicates the system by adding a separate set of standards on
top of the already-existing common law of the states.
The Roberts Court gave some indication in February 2008
that it would look favorably on federal preemption for FDA regu-
lations.' In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.' the Court held that the Medi-
cal Devices Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) preempted a plaintiffs state product liability claims
alleging defective design of a balloon catheter that the FDA had
approved.' The amendment expressly provides that states may
not "establish or continue in effect . . . any requirement . . .
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement appli-
cable under [federal law] to the device."' The Court concluded
that this prohibition on state regulation logically extends to state
common-law rulings as well.9 However, about one year after the
Riegel decision, the Court in Levine came down on the opposite
side of the preemption debate regarding warning labels on pre-
scription drugs. It gave new life to the "presumption against pre-
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Medical Double Jeopardy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2008, at
A8.
6. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
7. Id. at 330.
8. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
9. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324-25.
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emption"o which had guided prior Court decisions in conflict of
law cases," and it suggested that Congress's desire for preemp-
tive effect must be quite clear in an organic statute,12 giving little
weight to the FDA's interpretation in favor of preemption.13
The Court's decision in Levine is hailed by some as one of
the most important victories for consumers in many years. Erwin
Chemerinsky claims that the Court's stand against preemption
"preserves the ability of injured consumers to sue pharmaceutical
companies for the companies' failure to provide adequate warn-
ings."14 He notes that "[h]ad the Court's decision gone the
other way, it would have barred many lawsuits brought by people
who were hurt by prescription drugs." The decision also satis-
fies others who view the FDA as largely inadequate at ensuring
consumer safety in the pharmaceutical industry." Thomas 0.
McGarity believes that "[t]he court wisely prevented Wyeth from
palming off its responsibility to warn doctors and patients onto
an overworked and underfunded federal agency that had been
more concerned with meeting industry demands for rapid new
drug approvals than with protecting patients from dangerous
drugs."" By preserving the right of consumers to bring tort
actions in state courts, Levine assures that the FDA's decisions
regarding prescription drugs are not conclusive. Many therefore
regard the private right of action, in addition to the federal regu-
lations, as a benefit to consumers and necessary in furtherance of
their safety.
Others recognize that Levine may actually be more detrimen-
tal than beneficial to consumers. In his dissent in the case, Jus-
tice Alito lamented that the Court's decision makes state tort
juries, rather than the FDA, ultimately responsible for regulating
warning labels for prescription drugs.1 The consequences of
this are further explained by Richard Epstein, who notes that
10. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009).
11. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1201.
14. Erwin Chemerinsky, Wyeth Is Victory for Consumers, Blow to Preemption,
TRiAL, May 2009, at 54, 54.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of
the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 467, 477,
483-95 (2008).
17. Thomas 0. McGarity, Op-Ed., A Victory for Consumers in 'Pre-emption
War,' Hous. CHRON. (Mar. 7, 2009, 10:15 CST), http://www.chron.com/disp/
story.mpl/editorial/outlook/6298862.html.
18. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1217 (AlitoJ., dissenting).
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opponents of preemption "consider only one kind of error in the
drug approval process: its willingness to allow dangerous
drugs . . . on the market. But two kinds of errors are evident:
letting drugs on the market that should be kept off and taking
drugs off of the market that should be left on."' This is indeed
the balance that the FDA seeks to strike.2 0 Just as it is important
to protect consumers from the harmful effects of defective medi-
cal products, it is equally important to ensure that consumers
have access to potentially life-saving prescription drugs. It may in
fact be a greater harm to a greater number of consumers if phar-
maceutical companies are forced to raise prices, curb innovation,
and even remove valuable drugs from the market due to the
unpredictable threat of litigation in individual states."
This Note takes the position that the benefits of federal pre-
emption in the pharmaceutical industry far outweigh the costs.
Considering the extent to which the FDA regulates prescription
drugs, and considering the large national market for them, deny-
ing federal preemption actually defeats many of the goals that
federalization is meant to accomplish. The need to decrease
costs, increase availability, encourage innovation, and create uni-
form rules in the pharmaceutical industry has become more
apparent than ever as a result of the country's focus on health
care, and federal preemption is crucial to satisfying these needs.
By eliminating federal preemption in the regulation of prescrip-
tion drug warning labels, Levine will hurt American consumers
far more than it will help them.
This argument is still worth making because Congress could
effectively overrule Levine by enacting an express preemption
provision in the FDCA for prescription drugs, similar to that
already in force for the type of medical devices that were at issue
in Riegel. Unfortunately, the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment are currently heading in the opposite direction. Rather
than seeking to place medical devices and prescription drugs on
the same level by extending federal preemption to the latter,
members of Congress have been attempting to undo federal pre-
19. Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug
Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 463, 469 (2009).
20. See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner at 15-17, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249).
21. See John E. Calfee, IDA Preemption and Patient Welfare in Wyeth v.
Levine 6 (Am. Enter. Inst. Pub. Pol'y Res., Health Policy Outlook Series No. 9,
2008); James R. Copland & Paul Howard, In the Wake ofWyeth v. Levine: Making
the Case for FDA Preemption and Administrative Compensation 4 (Manhattan Inst.,
Project FDA Report No. 1, 2009); Jodie M. Gross & Judi Abbott Curry, The Fed-
eral Preemption Debate in Pharmaceutical Labeling Product Liability Actions, 43 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 35, 36 (2007).
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emption for the former. Congressmen Henry Waxman and
Frank Pallone recently introduced the Medical Device Safety Act
of 2009 which, along with its companion bill introduced by the
late Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Patrick Leahy, would
nullify the Court's ruling in Riegel by adding language to the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to ensure that the law does
not prohibit suits against device manufacturers.2 2 An effort to
remove federal preemption is sweeping through the executive
branch as well. On May 20, 2009, President Obama issued a
memorandum to executive departments and agencies prohibit-
ing them from including preemption provisions in codified regu-
lations and regulatory preambles, and requiring them to review,
and amend where possible, regulations issued within the past ten
years intended to preempt state law.2 ' Given current govern-
ment officials' hostility toward federal preemption, this Note
ambitiously aims to persuade them, and the public to whom they
are accountable, that federal preemption is crucial in regulating
our nation's prescription drug industry, and that its benefits indi-
cate that it should be advanced, not eliminated.
Because cases dealing with federal preemption often raise a
plethora of interconnected issues, it is worth noting what this
Note does not attempt to do. Considerations of the preemptive
effect of FDA regulations inevitably involve questions of defer-
ence to agency positions. Specifically, much controversy has
arisen around the Supreme Court's unwillingness in Levine to
give deference to the FDA's 2006 preamble. This Note will cer-
tainly consider the FDA's position as expressed in the preamble,
yet it will not delve into the intricate questions regarding the
appropriate degree of judicial deference to such instruments.
While these administrative law issues are undoubtedly important
in the preemption context, other authors have given them thor-
ough treatment,24 and there is little need to rehash those argu-
22. S. 540, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
For a discussion of the possible consequences of removing preemption for med-
ical devices, see ERNST BERNDT & MARK TRUSHEIM, BERNDT Assoc., THE Eco-
NOMIC IMPACTS OF ELIMINATING FEDERAL PREEMPTION FOR MEDICAL DEVICES ON
PATIENTS, INNOVATION, AND JOBs (2009), http://www.advamed.org/NR/
rdonlyres/DCC3B34A-6257-4A3F-ADE4-4093904178CD/0/EmbargoedBerndt
TrusheimPreemptionPaper.pdf; Hans A. von Spakovsky, Killing Americans by Sti-
fling Medical Innovation: The Medical Device "Safety" Act of 2009 (The Heritage
Found., Legal Memorandum No. 46, 2009), http://thf-media.s3.amazonaws.
com/2009/pdf/Im0046.pdf.
23. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
74 Fed. Reg. 24693 (May 22, 2009).
24. See, e.g., Preemption of State Common Law Claims, 123 HARv. L. REV. 262
(2009); Gross & Curry, supra note 21; Christina Rodrfquez, The FDA Preamble: A
6412011]
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ments here. Rather, this Note seeks to analyze the Court's
independent judgment and offer a purely normative evaluation
of federal preemption in the prescription drug context, analyz-
ing its merits as may be observed by judges and policy makers
alike.
This Note will proceed in four main sections. The first
presents a brief summary of the facts in Levine. The second con-
siders the "presumption against preemption" that guided the
Court's decision,25 analyzing it against first principles and in the
context of the different forms of preemption. The third section
examines the Court's legal reasoning in Levine, placing it against
the backdrop of the Court's previous preemption decisions. The
fourth section considers the policy implications for the pharma-
ceutical industry, and ultimately for the public, of allowing indi-
vidual state tort juries to decide matters concerning nationally-
marketed prescription drugs. It focuses on, and gives concrete
examples of, the effects on consumer safety, availability of pre-
scription drugs, drug prices, and innovation in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry.
I. SUMMARY OF WYETH V. LEVINE
Levine involved a lawsuit over the injection of the anti-nau-
sea drug promethazine hydrochloride, which Wyeth sold under
the brand name Phenergan.26 Phenergan can be administered
intravenously through either the "IV-push" method, whereby the
drug is injected directly into a patient's vein, or the "IV-drip"
method, whereby the drug is introduced into a saline solution in
a hanging intravenous bag and slowly descends through a cathe-
ter inserted in a patient's vein." The manufacturer's label
warned against the danger of gangrene and amputation if the
drug entered an artery.28 It allowed the drug to be administered
by the "IV-push" method in some circumstances, but it warned
that any injection should be through the tubing of an intrave-
nous infusion set that is known to be functioning satisfactorily.29
Backdoor to Federalization of Prescription Warning Labels?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
161, 169-79 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemp-
tion of State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 437 (2008); Kathe-
rine M. Glaser, Comment, A Step Toward Preemption: The Effect of the FDA's 2006
Preamble, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 871, 893-97 (2007).
25. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009).
26. Id. at 1191.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1192.
THE OTHER WAR ON DRUGS
The FDA approved this label in 1998, emphasizing that Wyeth
must retain this "identical" verbiage on its final printed label.s
The lawsuit over this label was successful largely because of
its tragic facts. Diane Levine, a string bass player and composer
of children's music in Vermont,3' went to her health care pro-
vider for treatment of a migraine headache and associated nau-
sea.3 2 She was given an intra-muscular injection of Phenargen,
but it did not provide much relief.33 She returned later in the
day and was given an "IV-push" injection of the drug." She
developed complications from a mistake in the injection, with
the drug entering an artery, resulting in gangrene.3 1 She ulti-
mately had to have her forearm amputated, ending her career as
a musician.
Levine's situation made for an easy malpractice suit; the phy-
sician's assistant who treated her disregarded Phenergan's label
and pushed the drug into the spot on her arm where inadvertent
intra-arterial injection is most likely.37 Accordingly, she won a
$700,000 settlement against the physician's assistant, the supervis-
ing physician, and the clinic." But she did not stop there-she
proceeded to sue Wyeth in a Vermont state court, arguing that
the pharmaceutical firm should have revised its FDA-approved
label to bar IV-push injections." A jury ruled in her favor, and
awarded her $6,774,000,4o which was affirmed by the Vermont
Supreme Court.4 1
On certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court, Wyeth argued
that it would have been impossible for it to comply with the state-
law duty to modify Phenergan's labeling without violating federal
law.4 2 It also argued that recognition of Levine's state tort action
creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress because it substitutes a lay jury's decision about drug label-
30. Id.
31. Newshour (PBS television broadcast Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec08/scotus_1 1-03.html.





37. Id. at 1226 (AlitoJ., dissenting).
38. Calfee, supra note 21, at 1.
39. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191-92.
40. Levine v. Wyeth, No. 670-12-01 Wncv., 2004 WL 5452938 (Vt. Super.
Ct. 2004).
41. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006).
42. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1193.
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ing for the expert judgment of the FDA." The FDA supported
this assessment: in the preamble to a January 2006 rule concern-
ing the labeling of drugs, the agency explained its view that
"under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling
under the [FDCA] . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State
law."' Yet despite the agency's clear statement in favor of pre-
emption, the Court ruled against Wyeth in a six-to-three decision
by Justice Stevens, saying that Congress did not authorize the
FDA directly to preempt state lawsuits and that it was not impossi-
ble for Wyeth to change its label." It thus regarded the FDA
regulations as merely a floor, rather than a floor and a ceiling,
arguing that state tort suits will complement FDA regulation and
better advance the public health. 6
II. DEBUNKING THE "PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION"
The Supreme Court in Levine framed its decision by first lay-
ing out the two "cornerstones of preemption jurisprudence" 7
that would guide its analysis. The first, on its own, is sound: that
"the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-
emption case."4 8 The second, however, is problematic, and in a
way misconstrues the first: that "[i] n all preemption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated . . . in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied,' . . . we 'start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 49 This is the "pre-
sumption against preemption" that has been mimicked through-
out the Court's preemption jurisprudence for over sixty years
with little or no consideration for its proper context or applica-
tion.o This Note will demonstrate the flaws of this presumption
first by returning to first principles, and then by examining its
practical application in different preemption contexts.
43. Id. at 1193-94.
44. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Pre-
scription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201). See also Brief for the United States of
America, supra note 20, at 26-27.
45. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
46. Id. at 1202.
47. Id. at 1194.
48. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
49. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
50. Gross & Curry, supra note 21, at 41-42.
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A. First Principles
The "presumption against preemption" is a curious prece-
dent given the federal Constitution's clear mandate for the
supremacy of federal law. The doctrine of federal preemption is
rooted in the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United-
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."
This, of course, is not an unqualified grant of power to the
federal government to override state law whenever and on any
issue it pleases. Rather, this clause only comes into effect in situa-
tions where the federal government exercises a legitimate enu-
merated power under the Constitution. As Alexander Hamilton
explained, the Supremacy Clause does not mean "that acts of the
[federal government] which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of
the [states], will become the supreme law of the land. These will
be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as
such."" Preemption therefore does not expand the scope of the
federal government's powers, for it only applies after the exis-
tence of federal power over a subject has already been
established.
In determining the preemptive power of federal law, one
must always consider the Supremacy Clause in conjunction with
the enumerated power Congress is exercising in a given case.
Concerns may arise regarding whether a power of the federal
government has been overextended to the point where it unduly
infringes on powers that are meant to be reserved to the states.
However, once it is determined that the federal government is
acting in accordance with a constitutionally enumerated power,
the preemptive effect of such action cannot be deemed an
infringement on the power of the states. Indeed, preemption is
often essential to protect individuals and business associations
from regulation by two sovereign entities in the same field.
According to Justice Harlan, "The constitutional principles of
[preemption], in whatever particular field of law they operate,
51. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
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are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting
regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have
some authority over the subject matter.""
Preemption is often necessary for the purpose of an enumer-
ated federal power to be fulfilled. This is especially true in situa-
tions where the states have concurrent sovereignty or an
overlapping sovereignty over the subject matter the federal gov-
ernment is seeking to regulate. Some of the Supreme Court's
oldest and most famed cases recognized the need for federal pre-
emption in such instances. Most notably, in McCulloch v. Mary-
land,54 the State of Maryland was attempting to use its concurrent
taxing power to tax a branch of the federal bank established
within its jurisdiction." Having determined the incorporation of
the bank was indeed pursuant to an enumerated constitutional
power of the federal government, the Court held that the State's
power to tax in this instance must be preempted if the legitimate
federal objective is to be accomplished." Chief Justice Marshall
explained that, in determining a state law's subordination to fed-
eral law:
no principle not declared, can be admissible, which would
defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme government.
It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obsta-
cles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify
every power vested in subordinate governments, as to
exempt its own operations from their own influence. This
effect need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the
declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that
the expression of it could not make it more certain....
[T]he States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress
to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government. This is, we think, the unavoidable conse-
quence of that supremacy which the constitution has
declared."
53. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
285-86 (1971).
54. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
55. Id. at 317.
56. Id. at 424, 436-37.
57. Id. at 427, 436.
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Often, the enumerated federal power at issue in preemption
questions is the power to regulate interstate commerce.5 8 This is
true because of its vast expansion over the years, as well as its
innate ability to overlap with other powers that would otherwise
be reserved to the states. The federal government undoubtedly
exercises this power more liberally today than it did in the early
days of the Republic; indeed, those who insisted on the inclusion
of the Commerce Clause in the Constitution were concerned pri-
marily with the narrow issues of tariffs and trade." However, the
general principle of common interest-that no state should be
able to manipulate national commerce policy to the detriment of
others-has always been the purpose underlying the Commerce
Clause. In discussing the need for federal commerce power,
Alexander Hamilton commented, "If the states had distinct inter-
ests, were unconnected with each other, their own governments
would then be the proper and could be the only depositaries of
such a power; but as they are parts of a whole with a common
interest in trade, as in other things, there ought to be a common
direction in that as in all other matters.""o "Common direction,"
therefore, is necessary in commerce to prevent states from pursu-
ing their distinct interests when their common interests in the
Union are much greater. This can only be accomplished, moreo-
ver, if that "common direction" supplants direction by the states;
otherwise, the problem of states pursuing distinct interests still
remains, and the "common direction" achieves nothing that
could not be achieved by the states individually.
The need for federal supremacy in the area of commerce
was at the heart of the Supreme Court's first great Commerce
58. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ...
[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.").
59. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. V, in 3 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 75, 75-76 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) ("The vesting
Congress with the power of regulating trade ought to have been a principal
object of the confederation."); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 267 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A very material object of this power was the relief
of the States which import and export through other States from the improper
contributions levied on them by the latter."); James Madison, Preface to the
Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 539, 547-48 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ("Besides the vain attempts to
supply their respective treasuries by imposts, which turned their commerce into
the neighbouring ports, and to co-erce a relaxation of the British monopoly of
the W. Indn. navigation, which was attemted by Virga. the States having ports
for foreign commerce, taxed & irritated the adjoining States, trading thro'
them, as N. Y. Pena. Virga. & S-Carolina.").
60. Hamilton, supra note 59, at 78.
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Clause case. In Gibbons v. Ogden," the Court recognized that, if a
state can restrict within its own borders the exercise of a commer-
cial right that Congress has granted, then commerce throughout
the whole nation is affected and the granting of such right by
Congress is futile." Specifically, the Court found that a federal
coasting statute, enacted under the commerce power and
intended to grant licenses to carry on in the coasting trade, must
trump a New York state law that restricted the rights of steamboat
operators in New York waters." Again, Chief Justice Marshall's
words on this subject are instructive:
It will at once occur, that, when a Legislature attaches cer-
tain privileges and exemptions to the exercise of a right
over which its control is absolute, the law must imply a
power to exercise the right. The privileges are gone, if the
right itself be annihilated. It would be contrary to all rea-
son, and to the course of human affairs, to say that a State
is unable to strip a vessel of the particular privileges attend-
ant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right
itself; that the State of New-York cannot prevent an
enrolled and licensed vessel, proceeding from Elizabeth-
town, in New-Jersey, to New-York, from enjoying, in her
course, and on her entrance into port, all the privileges
conferred by the act of Congress; but can shut her up in
her own port, and prohibit altogether her entering the
waters and ports of another State. To the Court it seems
very clear, that the whole act on the subject of the coasting
trade, according to those principles which govern the con-
struction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to
licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade. 64
The similarities between Gibbons and the modern question
of FDA preemption for prescription drugs are striking. Both
involve the issue of whether an action of the federal government,
purportedly exercised in the interest of interstate commerce,
must displace interfering state law, even if the state law is pursu-
ant to a power historically reserved to the states. Chief Justice
Marshall entertained no presumption that state law should stand
merely because it is pursuant to a reserved power of the states
rather than to an enumerated power of the federal government.
Regarding the effect of the Supremacy Clause, he clearly indi-
cated that
61. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
62. See id. at 211-12.
63. Id. at 239-40.
64. Id. at 211-12.
THE OTHER WAR ON DRUGS
[tlhe appropriate application of that part of the clause
which confers . . . supremacy on laws and treaties, is to
such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their
powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknowl-
edged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the
laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,
or some treaty made under the authority of the United
States.
The argument that there should be a "presumption against
preemption" in the regulation of prescription drugs because it
would supersede a "historic police power of the states," there-
fore, holds no weight. Furthermore, both Gibbons and the pre-
sent case involve some sort of "license" granted by the federal
government to carry on in a venue of interstate commerce. Con-
gress has entrusted the FDA with the responsibility of regulating
prescription drugs, and those manufacturers who comply with all
the FDA's standards with respect to a given drug are thus given
the right to market that drug in the interstate commerce system.
Where a state may impose further standards, and effectively
penalize the manufacturer for exercising its marketing right, the
imprimatur of the FDA becomes meaningless.
If the commerce power, or any enumerated power, is to
have any significant purpose, then its preemptive effect over con-
trary or interfering state laws should be coterminous with the
extent of the power itself. Without federal preemption, states
may try to extract as many gains out of the interstate commerce
system as they can. This runs contrary to the principle of com-
mon interest that is central to the Commerce Clause. In fact,
one may argue that a purported attempt by the federal govern-
ment to regulate an area of commerce that does not also pre-
clude state regulation over the same area is, in actuality, not
pursuant to this power at all. If state laws are not to be pre-
empted in such instance, then the motive of Congress must be
some other than the making of uniform commercial standards
and regulations. The Commerce Clause was not intended
merely to give the federal government the right to pass laws on
top of those enacted by the states. It is not an augmentation of
the state police power; rather, it is intended to give Congress the
ability to standardize and simplify the rights and obligations of
65. Id. at 211. Though ChiefJustice Marshall speaks directly of the acts of
state legislatures, one can assume that the same reasoning extends to interfer-
ing state common law rulings as well. The Court addressed, and affirmed, the
preemptive effect of federal law over interfering state common law in RiegeL
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individuals throughout the country in the interest of facilitating
interstate commerce.
B. Forms of Preemption
In deciding preemption questions, it is necessary to analyze
the relationship between federal law and state law. Given the
numerous ways in which federal law and state law interact and
overlap in our federal system, preemption is applied in several
different forms. Sometimes, it is expressly applied by Congress
in passing a statute, in which it makes clear its intent to preempt
state law in the area it is regulating. This is called express pre-
emption, and to the extent that a statute is considered "clear"
and within Congress's enumerated powers, there is rarely any
question left for the courts to decide." When Congress is silent
on the matter, as is often the case, state law may still be trumped
by federal law by means of implied preemption, of which there
are three general types. The first is conflict preemption, which
"exists if there is an actual conflict of language ... [that renders
it] impossible for a party to comply with both state and federal
requirements."6 ' The second is obstacle preemption. This exists
where there is not necessarily a physical impossibility of comply-
ing with both federal law and state law, but where state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."6' Finally, the third
type "exists if it appears that the federal statute has occupied the
field, blocking state efforts to impose sanctions within that field
even if there is no explicit conflict."6 ' Field preemption applies
where the federal body of law is "so pervasive as to make reasona-
ble the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it" or where the domain is "a field in which the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system [is] assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.""o
Most of the controversy surrounding federal preemption
revolves around the forms of implied preemption, for they
require courts to decide whether state law should be displaced
based on the construction of a federal statute and, as in the pre-
sent case, of administrative regulations pursuant to it. Even
among those who consider themselves Originalists, there are
some who reject this form of preemption and its justification
66. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 464.
67. Gross & Curry, supra note 21, at 44.
68. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
69. Epstein, supra note 19, at 464 (emphasis omitted).
70. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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under the Supremacy Clause. Most notably, Justice Thomas
takes a strong stand against implied preemption, basing his argu-
ment largely on the concept of states' rights. He authored a con-
curring opinion in the Levine case, agreeing with the Court's
decision based on the Constitution's provisions for dual sover-
eignty, but disagreeing with the Court's "implicit endorsement of
far-reaching implied [preemption] doctrines."" Justice Thomas
bases his objection to implied preemption on the principles
expressed by James Madison in The Federalist No. 51, specifically
that "the 'compound republic of America' provides 'a double
security ... to the rights of the people' because 'the power sur-
rendered by the people is first divided between two distinct gov-
ernments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate departments.'"72 He further drew
from The Federalist No. 45 in asserting that "' [t]he powers dele-
gated . . . to the federal government, are few and defined,' and
'l[t]hose which are to remain in the state governments, are
numerous and indefinite.' 7 3
To suggest that a "presumption against preemption" in
implied preemption contexts follows from these federalism prin-
ciples, however, is misguided. Federalism is not simply synony-
mous with "states' rights." Rather, it is a system for limiting
governmental power by spreading it among separate govern-
ments, and it would be contrary to its purpose if one government
could simply enact laws on top of those of another. Such would
be double jeopardy, not a double security. Furthermore, as
Roger Pilon notes, it is equally inappropriate to presume that
implied preemption is invalid as it is to presume that express pre-
emption is valid.7 4 In express as well as in implied preemption
cases, the underlying statute or regulation may in fact be ultra
vires, or beyond the powers enumerated to the federal govern-
ment. Such an overexpansion of federal power indeed seems to
be Justice Thomas's main concern. Yet if it is the case that the
federal government's regulation of prescription drugs exceeds its
commerce power and simply reaches into the reserved police
powers of the states, then the proper response is to disregard the
71. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
73. Id. at 1206 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
74. Roger Pilon, Into the Pre-emption Thicket: Wyeth v. Levine, 2009 CATo
SuP. CT. REv. 85, 105-06.
75. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1205-06 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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regulation as unconstitutional. The denial of preemption would
be no adequate remedy to such an improper exercise of power.
If anything, denying preemption in the prescription drug con-
text suggests even more that the federal government is primarily
concerned with exercising control over public health, a power
historically reserved to the states. If it were truly concerned with
regulating the commercial market for prescription drugs, then
preemption would be necessary to achieve its goal of uniformity.
Upon close examination of the three types of implied pre-
emption, it is hard to imagine how the "presumption against pre-
emption" can offer guidance with regard to any of them. Where
conflict preemption is at issue, congressional purpose does not
matter. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] holding of
federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no
inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."7 6 Cases
of obstacle preemption do involve a determination of the "object
and purpose" of a federal statute, but here it would be counter-
productive to assume the continued legitimacy of state law with-
out a thorough examination of the nature of the federal law in
question.77 The Court's answer should always strive to allow fed-
eral law its fullest effect, and it should not allow this to be tem-
pered by deference to state law. Finally, a "presumption against
preemption" in field preemption cases also defies logic. As Gross
and Curry explain, "Applying the presumption could result in
favoring a state's limited and potentially insufficient legislative
activity in an area in which Congress has taken steps to legislate
expansively-a clearly irrational outcome.""7  One may safely
assume, therefore, that if the federal government has decided to
comprehensively regulate a certain field, such regulation should
take precedence over less comprehensive regulations by the
states.
III. THE COURT'S LEGAL REASONING IN WYETH V. LEVINE
Wyeth raised defenses of conflict preemption and obstacle
preemption before the Supreme Court in Levine,7 both of which
76. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
77. See Gross & Curry, supra note 21, at 45.
78. See id. at 45.
79. See Brief for the Petitioner, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)
(No. 06-1249). Richard Epstein takes the position that field preemption is in
fact the most appropriate preemption type for FDA drug regulation. See
Epstein, supra note 19, at 465. Field preemption is one option Congress could
consider if it decides to provide an express preemption clause. However, this
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the Court rejected. Wyeth first argued that Levine's state-law
claims were preempted because it was impossible for it to comply
with both the state-law duties underlying those claims and its fed-
eral labeling duties."o Because the FDA's pre-market approval of
a new drug application includes the approval of the exact text in
the proposed warning label," Wyeth contended that it could
have only changed its label for Phenargen after submitting a sup-
plemental application to the FDA and obtaining the agency's
approval." Wyeth also argued that requiring it to comply with a
state-law duty to provide a stronger warning about "IV-push"
administration would obstruct the purposes and objectives of fed-
eral drug labeling regulation." It maintained that Levine's tort
claims were preempted because they interfered with "Congress's
purpose to entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling deci-
sions that strike a balance between competing objectives."8 4
Accordingly, Wyeth relied on the FDA's position that approval of
a new drug under the FDCA and its implementing regulations
"establish [es] both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling"' with respect to drug
labeling."
In addressing Wyeth's impossibility argument, the Court
cited an FDA regulation that permits a manufacturer to make
certain changes to its label before receiving the agency's
approval." This "changes being effected" (CBE) regulation
allows manufacturers "[t] o add or strengthen a contraindication,
warning, precaution, or adverse reaction" or "[t]o add or
strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that
is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product."" This
regulatory exception, however, is only intended to allow a label-
ing change "to reflect newly acquired information" or "new anal-
yses of previously submitted data."8  The Court's decision
therefore implied that Wyeth had obtained new information or
Note prefers the conflict and obstacle preemption reasoning espoused by
Wyeth and the FDA; it is more narrowly tailored to state laws and rulings that
interfere with the federal scheme, and it recognizes that the states still maintain
the general power to protect public health.
80. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 79, at 29.
81. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009).
82. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 79, at 31.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id. at 46.
85. Id. at 45.
86. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1196 (2009).
87. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (6) (iii) (A), (C) (2009).
88. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for
Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,609
(Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314.3).
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conducted new analyses of existing data, and that it failed to
appropriately strengthen its label in response. It is unclear, how-
ever, to what "new information" or "new analyses" the Court was
referring. As Richard Epstein observes, "The sketchy record
reveal[ed] no evidence collected after the drug hit the market
indicating a higher incidence of this failure (and perhaps others)
that might call for a reevaluation of the risk/reward ratio for [the
IV-push] procedure."" The Court even admitted that "the
record [was] limited concerning what newly acquired informa-
tion Wyeth had or should have had about the risks of IV-push
administration of Phenergan."oo While there was evidence of
about twenty incidents over the preceding forty-five-year period
in which a Phenergan injection resulted in gangrene and an
amputation," these incidents did not demonstrate an increased
risk that the FDA had not already considered. The approved
label warned against these exact side effects. The Court was
therefore suggesting that Wyeth should have second-guessed the
FDA's decision in order to fulfill a state-law duty to warn."
Wyeth's purposes and objectives argument fared no better,
for the Court found that it "relie [d] on an untenable interpreta-
tion of congressional intent and an overbroad view of an agency's
power to [preempt] state law."" The Court denied Wyeth's
claim that the FDCA established both a floor and a ceiling for
drug regulation by asserting that "all evidence of Congress' pur-
poses is to the contrary."" To support this assertion, it delved
into the history of the FDCA, focusing almost exclusively on Con-
gress' silence on the issue of preemption for prescription drug
regulation. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, reasoned that
"[i]f Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its
objectives, it surely would have enacted an express [preemption]
provision at some point during the FDCA's 70-year history.""
The Court also noted that Congress was aware of the operation
of state law in this field during this entire period." Based on
these observations, the Court reached the conclusion that Con-
gress must have never intended the FDA's regulatory judgment
to carry any weight in defending against a contrary judgment by a
state tort jury.
89. Epstein, supra note 19, at 469.
90. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1197.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1203-04.
93. Id. at 1199.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1200.
96. Id.
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This conclusion is flawed for several reasons. First, the
Court misunderstood what it means to consider Congress's pur-
pose. While it is true that the "purpose of Congress is the touch-
stone in every preemption case,"" this is not a requirement that
Congress expressly mandate preemption in order for it to apply.
As Roger Pilon observes, "[T] he Court appears to read [the 'pur-
pose of Congress' principle] as denoting simply Congress's [pre-
emptive] purpose, or lack thereof, not its substantive purpose in
enacting the statute in the first place."98 Indeed, if federal pre-
emption were to depend wholly on Congress's specific preemp-
tive purpose, then there would be no implied preemption
decisions in the first place. Such an interpretation is especially
unsound given the fact that Congress often legislates broadly and
cannot possibly foresee every conflict of laws that might arise.
The more accurate interpretation of "the purpose of Congress,"
therefore, is one that aims to discern Congress's substantive
intention in passing legislation. This type of assessment was the
basis for Wyeth's claim that "l[t] he Vermont judgment . . . frus-
trates ... Congress's objective of having an expert agency serve as
the ultimate regulator of the labeled conditions of use for which
a drug is approved.""
The Court's conclusion is also flawed because it disregards
important historical facts. In assuming "that Congress did not
regard state tort litigation as an obstacle to achieving its pur-
poses,"'00 the Court forgot that both "the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA), which was enacted in 1938, and its primary
subsequent amendments, adopted in 1962, predated the . . .
expansion of state product liability law" that enabled failure-to-
warn lawsuits like Levine's.' James Copland and Paul Howard
of the Manhattan Institute recall that " [i] t was not until 1963, in
the landmark California case Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., that Justice Traynor's doctrine of strict product liability
became law,"' 0 2 and it was "not until 1965 that the Second
Restatement of Torts launched modern failure-to-warn lawsuits
by opining that 'in order to prevent the product from being
unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give direc-
tions or warnings."'"o The fact that Congress was silent as to
97. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
98. Pilon, supra note 74, at 92.
99. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 79, at 40.
100. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
101. Copland & Howard, supra note 21, at 8.
102. Id. (referencing 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)).
103. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. j
(1965)).
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preemption for prescription drugs thus does not imply that it was
aware of state tort suits such as Levine's and desired for such suits
to persist in the face of detailed and comprehensive FDA
regulations.
The Court also disregarded its own precedent in concluding
that FDA regulations do not provide both a floor and a ceiling.
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,104 the Court was presented
with similar preemption issues regarding the Department of
Transportation's automotive regulations. There, the Court held
that state tort claims premised on Honda's failure to install
airbags conflicted with a federal regulation that did not require
airbags for all cars.o' Specifically, the Court found that such
claims presented an obstacle to achieving "the variety and mix of
devices that the federal regulation sought."o In Levine, how-
ever, the Court tersely dismissed its prior decision, attempting to
distinguish it by the fact that the Department of Transportation
in Geier conducted a formal rulemaking "bearing the force of
law."' It asserted that the FDA's 2006 preamble stating its pre-
emptive intent does not merit the same deference.10 Yet as the
Levine dissent accurately indicated, "the Geier Court specifically
rejected the argument . . . that conflict preemption is appropri-
ate only where the agency expresses its preemptive intent
through notice-and-comment rulemaking."' The dissent also
noted that "it is irrelevant that the FDA's preamble does not
'bear the force of law' because the FDA's labeling decisions
surely do." 1 o If anything, the FDA's regulations at issue in Levine
were even more deserving of preemptive effect, for in Geier the
Department of Transportation had made no statement on the
record of preemptive intent whatsoever.
Furthermore, the Court's theory that the FDA's regulations
do not provide both a floor and a ceiling is substantively untena-
ble. If these regulations were only to provide minimum require-
ments for what must be included on a drug's warning label, then
it would logically follow that the FDA anticipates fifty different
labels for the same drug, one to meet the specific requirements
of each state in the Union. This is certainly not the case. The
FDA is empowered by Congress to approve the uniform warning
label for the entire country that, in its expert judgment, most
104. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
105. Id. at 875.
106. Id. at 881.
107. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1203 (2009).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 885).
110. Id. at 1228.
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appropriately warns against the risks of the drug to which it is
attached. As a result of these uniform standards, a separate state
law duty would not simply require a manufacturer to alter its
label in that state-rather, it would require the manufacturer to
change its label in every state. The result of the Supreme Court's
refusal of preemption, therefore, is that state tort juries can exer-
cise the same authority as the FDA in setting nationwide prescrip-
tion drug policy.
Finally, the Court mistakenly assumed that state tort suits
would aid the FDA in formulating effective label regulations. Yet
the Levine case itself contradicts this. The Court never suggested
what new warnings should have been added through a CBE
application to strengthen the label, and to this day, the FDA's
substantive requirements for the label remain the same. After
reviewing all appropriate information, the FDA announced on
September 16, 2009, that it would continue to endorse the warn-
ing information previously contained in the Phenergan label,
and that it would merely require manufacturers to highlight
already-present cautionary information in a boxed warning and
to reiterate such information in the label's "Dosage and Adminis-
tration" section."' The agency's new directive still does not pro-
hibit the "IV-push" method for the drug, despite the fact that the
jury in Levine's case found that such a prohibition should have
been included. Indeed, the "FDA, after thorough review, now
has rejected a central premise of Levine's argument-i.e., that
the IV push method of administration should have been fore-
closed entirely."1 1 2 While this ex post facto review confirms that
the Vermont jury's verdict conflicts with the FDA's judgment, the
Levine decision will nevertheless require courts to reject preemp-
tion defenses in failure-to-warn cases unless the FDA has already
considered and rejected the warning label at issue. Sheldon
Bradshaw, former Chief Counsel to the FDA, expects that this
will only increase the number of CBE applications submitted to
the FDA, thereby stretching the agency's limited resources even
further." This extra and unnecessary work will thus inhibit the
FDA's ability to formulate effective label regulations, not aid it.
111. Press Release, FDA, FDA Requires Boxed Warning for Promethazine
Hydrochloride Injection (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucml82498.htm.
112. Bert W. Rein, Karyn K. Ablin & Brendan J. Morrissey, Bureau of
National Affairs, FDA's Promethazine Labeling Action: Too Little or Too Late? 7
PHARM. LAW AND INDUs. REPORT 1151, 2 (2009).
113. Sheldon Bradshaw, New Directions in Federal Preemption: FDA
Regulatory Symposium (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.ehcc.com/presentations/
fdasymposium4/bradshaw_1.pdf.
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IV. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DENYING FEDERAL
PREEMPTION FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
A. Consumer Safety
Denying federal preemption for prescription drugs will have
an adverse effect on consumer safety. Most notably, the presence
of state common-law duties on top of FDA regulations will lead to
overwarning on prescription drug labels, a problem that the
Department of Health and Human Services addressed in its ami-
cus brief in Levine."' It described two distinct ways that
overwarning can be detrimental to public health: first, it noted
that " [e] xaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate use of
a beneficial drug.""' As drug manufacturers are incentivized to
include warnings for every possible risk, they may discourage
physicians from prescribing drugs in situations when the drugs
may in fact be beneficial. Second, the Department noted that
"excessive warnings can cause more meaningful risk information
to 'lose its significance."'" As drug labels become cluttered
with warnings, most of which relate to trivial risks, physicians may
begin to disregard the warnings that are most important. While
the FDA can consider these issues in reviewing warning labels,
tort juries cannot. Hence the threat of state tort suits may now
give the FDA reason to skew its decisions in favor of overwarning.
There are cases that illustrate the potentially harmful effect
of pressure on the FDA to increase its warning requirements for
certain drugs. One involves a wave of criticism of the FDA alleg-
ing inadequate warnings for the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitor (SSRI) class of antidepressants, which was linked to
suicidality among young users."' In response to such criticism,
which was spurred by litigation over these drugs, the FDA imple-
mented its strongest "black box" warning for all antidepressants,
not just SSRIs." 8 However, recent studies have shown that SSRI
use actually results in lower suicide rates, and that these overly
strong warnings have caused a failure to prescribe SSRIs to
depressed individuals who genuinely need them. 1 9 As a result,
114. Brief for the United States of America, supra note 20, at 17.
115. Id. (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3935 (2006)).
116. Id. (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 37,447 (1979); accord 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935;
65 Fed. Reg. 81,083 (2000)).
117. Calfee, supra note 21, at 3.
118. Id.
119. SeeJeffrey A. Bridge et al., Clinical Response and Risk for Reported Sui-
cidal Ideation and Suicide Attempts in Pediatric Antidepressant Treatment: A Meta-anal-
ysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 297 JAMA 1683 (2007); Jeffrey A. Bridge et
al., Research Letter, Suicide Trends Among Youths Aged 10 to 19 Years in the United
States, 1996-2005, 300 JAMA 1025 (2008); Robert D. Gibbons et al., Early Evi-
THE OTHER WAR ON DRUGS
the risk of suicide for such patients ends up being greater than
for those who use these drugs.
Critics of preemption nevertheless claim that the denial of
state tort suits would be detrimental to consumer safety, for it
would remove the incentive for manufacturers to continue to
look for potential risk after obtaining approval by the FDA. As
Mary Davis argues,
To permit preemption based on an FDA-approved label,
even one that specifically rejected proposed language as
unsubstantiated, will create a disincentive to manufacturers
to act promptly based on acquired evidence of risk.
Indeed, it creates a disincentive to seek in the first instance
evidence of increased risks or adverse side effects which
may be available.120
This line of argument, however, ignores the cost of
overwarning and "sidestep [s] the tension that often exists
between the incentives generated by common-law litigation and
the FDA's own cost-benefit analysis."' It also ignores the fact
that federal law already mandates that manufacturers continue to
evaluate a drug's risk and report new information and assess-
ments to the FDA. Federal regulations provide that, after a drug
has been approved and marketed, the manufacturer must investi-
gate and report to the FDA any adverse events associated with the
use of the drug in humans,'2 2 and must periodically submit any
new information that may affect the FDA's previous conclusions
about the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug.1 23 While
it is important that manufacturers continue to improve the safety
of their products, federal law, not state law, should be the
standard.
dence on the Effects of Regulators' Suicidality Warnings on SSRI Prescriptions and Sui-
cide in Children and Adolescents, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1356 (2007); Jens Ludwig,
Dave E. Marcotte & Karen Norbert, Anti-depressants and Suicide, 28 J. HEALTH
ECON. 659 (2009); Robert E. McKeown, Steven P. Cuffe & Richard M. Schulz,
U.S. Suicide Rates by Age Group, 1970-2002: An Examination of Recent Trends, 96
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1744 (2006); Cynthia R. Pfeffer, Editorial, The FDA Pediatric
Advisories and Changes in Diagnosis and Treatment of Pediatric Depression, 164 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 843 (2007); Gregory E. Simon et al., Suicide Risk During Antidepres-
sant Treatment, 163 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 41 (2006); Madhukar H. Trivedi et al.,
Evaluation of Outcomes with Citalopram for Depression Using Measurement-Based Care
in STAR*D Implications for Clinical Practice, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 28 (2006).
120. Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and
the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1151 (2007).
121. Copland & Howard, supra note 21, at 11.
122. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2009).
123. Id. § 314.81.
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B. Availability of Prescription Drugs
Levine will also likely inhibit consumers' access to beneficial
prescription drugs. As manufacturers face potentially exorbitant
litigation costs, many will opt to remove certain drugs from the
market even though they have been approved by the FDA. The
most famous example of this is the morning-sickness drug
Bendectin, which became the subject of junk-science allegations
that it caused birth defects. It "was used by as many as [twenty-
five] percent of all expectant mothers in 1980," but by 1983, its
manufacturer pulled it from the U.S. market in the face of $18
million in annual legal bills which were barely offset by $20 mil-
lion in annual sales.1 24 Over thirty studies have failed to find a
link between Bendectin and birth defects, and yet the drug
remains unavailable to women in the U.S. even while it is still
marketed in other parts of the world.12' Furthermore, since it
was discontinued in the U.S., "the percentage of pregnant
women hospitalized each year for morning sickness has doubled,
but the incidence of birth defects has not declined." 26 Such sta-
tistics are indeed taken into account by the FDA during the drug
approval process. However, if the FDA's judgments do not have
preemptive effect, the agency's cost-benefit analysis becomes
meaningless, as state tort juries can effectively force drugs that
are largely beneficial to society off the market.
C. Drug Prices
Preserving tort liability for FDA-approved prescription drugs
will increase the cost of drugs as well. Pharmaceutical companies
must plan ahead for future litigation expenses they can reasona-
bly expect to incur, and this ultimately is reflected in the price
consumers pay for drug products. Because manufacturers can-
not be sure that their compliance with FDA standards will shield
them from state tort litigation, they must expect greater litigation
expenses, and thus must charge more for their products. Health
economist Richard Manning, who conducted a pair of studies
that examined the effects of the tort liability system on the price
124. Copland & Howard, supra note 21, at 10. See also Marvin E. Jaffe,
Regulation, Litigation, and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Equation for
Safety, in PRODUcT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN
ENVIRONMENT 120, 126 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O.Jones eds., 1994) (using
Bendictin as an example of the "disparities between the goals of the regulatory
process and the tort liability system").
125. Copland & Howard, supra note 21, at 10.
126. Id.
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of vaccines in the 1980s, has demonstrated this effect.12 7
Whereas most vaccines doubled or tripled in wholesale price
between 1980 and 1989,128 two vaccines that were particularly liti-
gation-prone exhibited a much more dramatic increase in price.
The price of the oral polio vaccine increased almost sevenfold,
and the price of the DPT vaccine increased by a factor of more
than forty.129 Furthermore, the price effects of extensive litiga-
tion were exacerbated by the fact that many manufacturers of
these vaccines ended up taking them off the market, decreasing
the supply of vaccines and creating persistent vaccine
shortages.so
D. Innovation
Finally, denying federal preemption in prescription drug
regulation will deter innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
As Justice O'Connor has recognized, the threat of enormous
awards in state tort suits "has a detrimental effect on the research
and development of new products. Some manufacturers of pre-
scription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to
avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine
into the market."1 3 ' Because excessive tort liability increases the
expected costs of researching and developing new drugs, many
manufacturers simply find it unprofitable to engage in such
innovation. This is especially true for drugs intended for healthy
patients, such as children and pregnant women, for in such cases
it is much easier to blame any future ailment, regardless of actual
cause, on the use of the drug.13 2 One president of a major phar-
maceutical company posed the question: "Who in his right
mind ... would work on a product today that would be used by
pregnant women?"133 Vaccines have also proven particularly sus-
ceptible to litigation, and hence investment in them has been
impeded given their high risk and relatively low profit margin.
The Institute of Medicine has recognized that liability risks "act
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as a deterrent to vaccine production and thereby threaten the
public's health."13 4 Progress on many potentially valuable vac-
cines, such as one for the AIDS virus,' is being impeded by the
threat of liability, for tortjuries merely focus on the alleged harm
in a given case without considering a product's broader societal
value.
CONCLUSION
Wyeth v. Levine was a setback for American consumers and
for the federal system that is intended to protect them. The
American federal system is not one in which one state's judges,
trial juries, and trial lawyers should be shaping policy in the
national marketplace. Yet this is precisely what the Vermont
courts have done. Though the intention of concurrent state lia-
bility for prescription drugs is to protect consumers, it does not
accomplish this goal-it undermines it. In allowing both the fed-
eral government and state governments to regulate prescription
drugs, the Supreme Court disregards the fact that unified
national standards better promote consumer safety, lower the
cost of beneficial drugs, provide more consumer choice, and
encourage innovation. The Court also assumes that state tort
juries can make the same kind of cost-benefit analysis as the FDA.
They cannot. The very purpose of the FDA is to ensure that stan-
dards are set by experts who take into account the full range of
scenarios for society, not just the unfortunate facts of one specific
case. The benefit of a particular drug to the public as a whole
may outweigh the potential risk to a select number of people,
and physicians must be the ones to take those risks into account.
If Congress is truly serious about improving efficiency and effec-
tiveness in the health care industry, then it must address this
problem the Court has created. The answer is not to further
diminish the preemptive effect of FDA regulations in other areas,
but to restore the preemption of state failure-to-warn suits for
prescription drugs.
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